上仲案例分享|第一期：基金管理人未及时执行项目退出机制导致基金迟延清算下的违约责任

  2024-01-03 18:04 发表于上海

  基金管理人未及时执行项目退出机制导致基金迟延清算下的违约责任

  Typical Arbitration Case: Liability for Breach of Contract due to Deferred Liquidation of the Fund on Account of the FundManagement Institution’s Failure to Implement theFund Exit Mechanism in a Timely Manner

  关键词

  基金退出、迟延清算、谨慎勤勉义务

  Fund Exit, Deferred Liquidation, Obligations of Prudence and Diligence

  裁决要旨

  基金管理人无正当理由未针对迟延清算向投资人发送延期通知，亦未采取任何清算启动程序的，需承担迟延清算的违约责任。

  If the fund management institution fails to send an extension notice to investors for the deferred liquidation without justifiable reasons, and fails to take any liquidation initiation procedures, it shall bear liability for breach of contract for the deferred liquidation.

  典型意义

  在基金存续期间届满后，基金管理人应当按照基金合同约定，及时成立清算小组进行清算，如果存在特殊的清算障碍则应当及时向投资人披露。无正当理由迟延清算是基金管理人承担违约责任的常见情形之一。在司法实践中，基金管理人迟延清算存在各类原因，明确对迟延清算问题的判断标准、统一裁判路径，有助于区分延迟清算的责任主体。本案仲裁庭对于迟延清算中“无正当理由”的界定，将管理人的不作为列入违约责任范畴，有利于保护中小投资人面对清算僵局时的正当权益。

  After the expiration of the fund's duration, the fund management institution shall promptly establish a liquidation team to carry out liquidation in accordance with the provisions of the fund contract, and shall disclose to the investor in a timely manner if there are special liquidation obstacles. Deferred liquidation without justifiable reasons is one of the common situations in which fund management institution bear liability for breach of contract. In judicial practice, there are various reasons for fund management institution to defer liquidation. It is helpful to distinguish the responsible subjects of deferred liquidation by clarifying the judgment criteria and unifying the judgment path. The arbitral tribunal's definition of "without justifiable reasons" for deferred liquidation includes the management institution's inaction in the scope of liability for breach of contract, which is conducive to protecting the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors in the face of a liquidation impasse.

  基本案情

  20xx年10月，投资人周某（本案申请人）与A基金管理公司（本案被申请人，作为基金管理人）、B银行（基金托管人）签订《基金合同》，由周某申购一号基金份额，并支付基金认购款120万元。合同约定，基金存续期为自成立之日起15个月，满12个月基金管理人可选择提前结束，满15个月投资人可申请赎回；基金投资标的为目标公司的增资股权，每股股权投资价格为4元；基金以股权投资的方式取得目标公司的部分股权。资金闲置时可投向银行存款或者银行发行的期限在90天以内的短期理财产品，以提高资金使用效率；基金的投资收益主要来源于投资标的公司的预期收益，及基金存续期12个月后至存续期结束前目标公司预期进“全国中小企业股份转让系统”挂牌上市的股权溢价交易的收益。A基金管理公司与目标公司及案外人于20xx年12月签订《增资扩股协议》，A基金管理公司管理的一号基金向目标公司进行投资，投资期限自20xx年12月起至次年12月止；A基金管理公司将以增资的方式向目标公司进行投资，出资额为960万元（每股4元，共计240万股）；前述协议中对A基金管理公司的投资收益及风险控制进行了约定，包括：……3.次年12月前，若目标公司不能在“全国中小企业股份转让系统”挂牌上市或在本协议约定的投资期限内A基金管理公司未能通过“全国中小企业股份转让系统”等资本市场股权交易使本次的投资资金本金顺利退出，A基金管理公司可优先要求案外人按照投资额的溢价价款向A基金管理公司购回所持有的股权，保证A基金管理公司顺利退出及投资资金不受损失。如不能到期回购，A基金管理公司可以要求清算并享有清算优先收益权。根据合同约定，案涉基金应于20xx年3月5日到期。周某主张，基金到期后，A基金管理公司一直未按约进行清算，亦未依照勤勉尽责的原则适时对最终投资项目提出权利主张等举措以维护投资人的利益。A基金管理公司称其已在向被投企业进行催讨并与基金投资人讨论起诉事宜。

  In October 20xx, investor Zhou (the claimant in this case) signed a Fund Contract with a fund management company A (the respondent in this case, as the fund management institution) and Bank B (the fund custodian), and Zhou subscribed for the share of fund No.1 and paid the fund subscription fee of RMB 1.2 million. According to the contract, the duration of the fund is 15 months from the date of establishment. After 12 months, the fund management institution can end it early, and the investors can apply for redemption after 15 months. The investment subject matter of the fund is the capital increase equity of the target company, and the equity investment price per share is 4 yuan; the fund acquires part of the equity of the target company through equity investment. When funds are idle, they can be invested in bank deposits or short-term financial products issued by banks with a term of less than 90 days to improve the efficiency of the use of funds. The investment income of the fund mainly comes from the expected income of subject matter investment target company, and the equity premium transactions in which the target company is expected to be listed on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations after the fund's duration of 12 months to the end of the duration.

  Fund management company A signed an Agreement on Capital Increase and Share Expansion with the target company and the non-parties in December 20xx. Fund No. 1 managed by A invested in the target company, with the investment period starting from December 20xx to December of the following year. And the company A will invest in the target company by increasing capital, with an investment amount of 9.6 million yuan (4 yuan per share, a total of 2.4 million shares). The aforesaid agreement stipulates the investment income and risk control of fund management company A, including: ... 3. Before December of the following year, if the target company cannot be listed on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations or the fund management company A fails to successfully withdraw the investment capital through capital market equity transactions such as the National Equities Exchange and Quotations within the investment period agreed in this agreement, A may give priority to requiring the non-parties to buy back the equity held by A according to the premium price of the investment, so as to ensure fund management A's exit and no loss of investment funds. If the maturity repurchase is not possible, fund management company A may request liquidation and enjoy liquidation preference.According to the contract, the fund involved in the case is due to expire on March 5, 20xx.Zhou claimed that after the fund expired, fund management company A has not liquidated the fund as agreed, nor has it timely proposed rights claims on the final investment project in accordance with the principle of diligence and prudence to safeguard the interests of investors.Fund management company A stated that it has been urging the invested companies and discussing prosecution matters with fund investors.

  仲裁请求

  周某向上海金融仲裁院提出仲裁申请，请求仲裁庭裁决A基金管理公司向其返还投资本金、利息及仲裁费。

  Zhou filed an arbitration claim with the Shanghai Court of Financial Arbitration, requesting the arbitral tribunal to award fund management company A to return the investment principal, interest and arbitration fees.

  仲裁庭意见

  根据《基金合同》约定，案涉基金存续期限为15个月，于20xx年3月已届满。A基金管理公司仅在口头答辩中提出已通知托管人B银行及投资人基金延期，但并未提供任何证据材料证明其已送达有关基金延期的书面决定或其已按《基金合同》约定的方式适当通知托管人B银行及投资人该等延期事项，故A基金管理公司所称的基金延期这一事实仲裁庭不予认可；另外，本案中A基金管理公司亦未提供证据材料证明，其在基金存续期届满后进行过财产清算或与托管人B银行就清算小组成立或推进清算方面进行过任何协商，A基金管理公司既无合理延期通知又无任何清算启动的运营行为明显有违《基金合同》所约定的勤勉谨慎义务。对于A基金管理公司所称其未清算的原因，仲裁庭注意到，《增资扩股协议》明确约定了A基金管理公司的退出机制以及案外人的回购条款和连带责任担保条款，但A基金管理公司没有提供任何证据证明，在基金存续期限内或存续期届满后的合理期间内，其依约向目标公司及时主张过执行退出机制或主张过由案外人进行回购或承担连带担保责任，A基金管理公司在明知《基金合同》项下存续期限到期日以及基金到期后自身将要承担基金投资人赎回款偿付义务的情况下，仍未能合理主张投资权益以事先确保基金财产的流动性，基金期限届满后亦未积极主张投资项目中的违约救济，其作为基金管理人在投资项目中的不作为明显有违《基金合同》所约定的基金管理人最为根本的管理义务。综上，结合A基金管理公司在信息披露和风险揭示义务上亦存在违约情形，仲裁庭认为A基金管理公司应当向周某承担违约赔偿责任。

  According to the Fund Contract, the duration of the fund involved in the case was 15 months, which has expired in March 20xx. Fund management company A only stated in itsoral defense that it had notified custodian Bank B and the investors of the fund extension, but did not provide any evidence to prove that it had served a written decision on the fund extension or that it had made the decision as stipulated in the Fund Contract. Therefore, the fact that fund management company A claimed fund delay was not recognized by the arbitral tribunal. In addition, in this case, fund management company A has not provided evidence to prove that it has liquidated assets or negotiated with Bank B, the custodian, on the establishment or promotion of liquidation after the expiration of the fund's duration, and the operation of fund management company A without a reasonable delay notice or any liquidation commencement obviously violates the obligation of diligence and prudence agreed in the Fund Contract.

  As to the reasons for the non-liquidation claimed by fund management company A, the arbitral tribunal noted that the Agreement on Capital Increase and Share Expansion clearly stipulated the exit mechanism of fund management company A as well as the buy-back clauses and joint liability guarantee clauses for non-parties, but fund management company A did not provide any evidence to prove that during the duration of the fund or within a reasonable period after the expiration of the duration, it promptly requested the target company to implement the exit mechanism or advocate the buyback by non-parties or assume joint and several guarantee liabilities. Fund management company A failed to reasonably claim its investment rights to ensure the liquidity of fund assets in advance, and did not actively claim relief for breach of contract in the investment projects after the expiration of the fund duration, knowing that it would have to bear the obligation to repay the fund investors' redemption funds after the expiration of the duration. Its failure to act as a fund management institution in the investment project clearly violates the fund management institution's most fundamental management obligations as agreed in the Fund Contract.In summary, combined with the fact that fund management company A also breached its information disclosure and risk disclosure obligations, the arbitral tribunal held that fund management company A should bear the compensation liability for breach of contract to Zhou.

  裁决结果

  对于申请人仲裁请求所主张的本金损失及利息的合理部分，仲裁庭予以支持。关于本案仲裁费的承担问题，根据申请人仲裁请求中有关被申请人赔偿损失的主张获支持的程度，仲裁费由双方当事人按比例承担。

  The arbitral tribunal supports the reasonable portion of the principal loss and interest claimed by the applicant. Regarding the issue of bearing the arbitration fees in this case, the arbitration fees shall be borne by both parties in proportion to the extent to which the respondent's claim of compensation for losses in the applicant's arbitration claim is supported.

  案件评析

  私募基金管理人的核心义务即为“信义义务”，在《证券投资基金法》第九条中规定，基金管理人、基金托管人管理、运用基金财产，基金服务机构从事基金服务活动，应当恪尽职守，履行诚实信用、谨慎勤勉的义务。中国证监会颁布的《私募投资基金监督管理暂行办法》第四条也有同样的规定，并在第二十三条以列举的方式规定了基金管理人及其从业人员不得从事的行为。2020年底证监会发布《关于加强私募投资基金监管的若干规定》，第九条进一步扩充了不得从事行为的类型，其中第十二款规定“玩忽职守，不按照监管规定或者合同约定履行职责”即属于禁止之列。2023年9月1日生效的《私募投资基金监督管理条例》第三条也重申了这一点。实践中，在私募基金的《基金合同》或类似性质的基础性文件中，也常常可以看到同样或类似的约定。由此可以看出，无论法律法规或者基金合同的通行约定，均赋予了基金管理人恪尽职守及诚实勤勉的积极义务，基金管理人应当按照合同约定，穷尽可能维护和保障投资人利益。

  但在实践中部分私募基金管理人在所投项目出现问题后，简单将其归咎为市场风险，以已经向投资人做了风险披露为由，听之任之，不去积极行动起来维护基金及投资人权利，甚至出现一走了之的甩手跑路行为。不仅如此，有些基金管理人还有意怠于清算，在投资人未同意延期的情况下，不启动清算，其目的是希望维持基金仍然“正常运行”的虚假状态，以封闭基金不能提前退出为由让投资人无法主张退出，又以基金尚未清算无法确定收回金额为由让投资人也无法主张损失，严重损害投资人权益。本案例裁判逻辑和裁判结果具有很好的示范作用：私募基金管理人承担的信义义务是一项要求较高的积极义务，“不作为”本身就是违反了其所承担的积极义务。本案中，当私募基金所投资的标的企业出现问题后，在《增资扩股协议》明确约定了A基金管理公司的退出机制以及案外人的回购条款和连带责任担保条款的情况下，A基金管理公司没有证明其依约向目标公司及时主张过执行退出机制或主张过由案外人进行回购或承担连带担保责任。这种情况看起来不好理解，为什么私募基金管理人不去主张自己权利？实践中此种情况多数是因为在底层资产出问题的情况下，主张权利是需要付出相应成本，如律师费、诉讼仲裁费用等，这时候往往基金专户账上没有剩余资金，投资人也不愿意再额外承担成本，基金管理人自己也不愿意花费成本，所以基金管理人就往往把主张权利停留在口头上，简单催促一下或者发个催告函了事，不去真正有效地积极履行其义务，导致本可以有机会挽回的损失无法挽回，本身就是对其合同义务的严重违反。本案基金管理人不仅不去积极主张权利，也未按照《基金合同》延期，而实际上在这种情况下，延期往往需要持有人大会同意，除非基金管理人履职良好，否则持有人大会也往往对基金管理人失去信心，不愿意延期。但在未按合同延期的情况下，就应当清算，而本案显示，A基金管理人又无任何清算启动的运营行为，这又构成了怠于清算的违约行为。仲裁庭据此进行了裁判，宣示了“不作为”构成违约，应当承担违约责任。这一案例警示私募基金管理人，应当恪尽职守及诚信勤勉履行职责，“职责”本身就赋予了管理人积极义务，“不作为”本身就构成前述《关于加强私募投资基金监管的若干规定》第九条第十二款规定“玩忽职守，不按照监管规定或者合同约定履行职责”，也违反基金合同构成违约，应当承担相应的法律责任。

  The core obligation of private equity fund management institutions is "fiduciary duty". Article 9 of the Securities Investment Fund Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates that fund management institutions and fund custodians in managing and utilizing fund assets and fund service institutions in conducting fund service activities shall devote themselves to their duties and perform their obligations of good faith, prudence and diligence. Article 4 of the Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Private-Raised Investment Funds promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission also has the same provisions, and in Article 23, the acts that fund management institutions and their practitioners shall not engage in are specified by listing. At the end of 2020, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the Several Provisions on Strengthening the Regulation of Private Investment Funds. Article 9 further expanded the types of conduct that are not allowed to be engaged in, of which paragraph 12 of it stipulates that "neglect of duties, failure to perform duties in accordance with regulatory regulations or contractual agreements" is prohibited. This is also reiterated in Article 3 of the Regulation on the Supervision and Administration of Private Investment Funds, which came into effect on September 1, 2023. In practice, the same or similar agreements can often be seen in the fund contract of private equity funds or basic documents of similar nature. It can be seen from this that regardless of laws, regulations or general provisions of fund contracts, fund management institutions are given positive obligations to fulfill their duties of diligence and good faith, and the fund management institutions shall, in accordance with the contract, try their best to safeguard and protect the interests of investors.However, in practice, some private equity fund management institutions simply attribute the problems to market risks after problems occur in investment projects, and let them go on the grounds that they have already made risk disclosure to investors, instead of taking active actions to protect the rights of the funds and investors, and even run away. Not only that, some fund management institutions also intentionally neglect liquidation and do not start liquidation without investors agreeing to an extension. Their purpose is to maintain the false state that the fund is still "normally operating" and on the grounds that closed funds cannot exit early. It prevents investors from claiming withdrawal, and also prevents investors from claiming losses because the fund has not yet been liquidated and the recovery amount cannot be determined, which seriously damages the rights and interests of investors.The decision logic and result of this case serve as a good example: the fiduciary duty borne by private equity fund management institutions is a positive obligation with high requirements, and "inaction" itself is a violation of the positive obligation. In this case, when problems arise in the target company invested by the private equity fund, the withdrawal mechanism of the fund management company A, the buyback clause of non-parties and the joint and several liability guarantee clause are clearly stipulated in the Agreement on Capital Increase and Share Expansion, the fun management company A has not proven that it has promptly requested the target company to implement the withdrawal mechanism in accordance with the contract, or that the non-parties should carry out a repurchase or bear joint and several guarantee liabilities. This situation seems difficult to understand. Why don’t private equity fund management institutions assert their rights? In practice, most of this happens because when there is a problem with the underlying assets, claiming rights requires paying corresponding costs, such as attorneys' fees, litigation and arbitration costs, etc. At this time, there is often no remaining funds in the special fund account, and investors are not willing to bear additional costs, and fund management institutions themselves are not willing to spend costs. Therefore, fund management institutions often claim the rights to stay in words, simply urge or send a reminder letter, and do not actively perform their obligations in a truly effective and efficient way, resulting in irreparable losses that could have been recovered, which is itself a serious breach of its contractual obligations. The fund management institution in this case not only did not actively assert rights, but also failed to extend the time in accordance with the Fund Contract. In fact, in this case, the extension often requires the approval of the holders’ meeting. Unless the fund management institution performs its duties well, otherwise the holders’ meeting often loses confidence in the fund management institution and is unwilling to extend. However, if the contract is not extended, it should be liquidated. This case shows that the fund management institution A did not have any operational behavior of liquidation, which constituted a breach of contract for idling in liquidation. Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal made a judgement and declared that "inaction" constituted a breach of contract and should bear liability for breach of contract.This case serves as a warning to private equity fund management institutions that they should perform their duties with diligence, good faith and prudence. "Duty" itself gives management institutions positive obligations, and "inaction" itself constitutes "neglect of duties, failure to perform duties in accordance with regulatory regulations or contractual agreements" as stipulated in Article 9, paragraph 12, of the aforementioned Several Provisions on Strengthening the Regulation of Private Investment Funds, also constitutes a breach of contract and shall bear corresponding legal liability.

  （案例提供人：上海仲裁委员会副法律顾问冯晨露）

  免责重申：本案例系上海种裁委员会对相关案件进行的整理与编辑，不代表机构观点，不构成法律咨询意见。Disclaimer: This case is the compilation and editing of relevant cases by the Shanghai Arbitration Commission. It does not represent the views of the institution nor constitute legal advice.

  英文版本仅为示例翻译，如中英文版本有任何差异，以中文版本为准。

  The English version is a courtesy translation only. If there is any discrepancy between the Chinese and English version, the Chinese version prevails.